Thinking fast, thinking badly by Jiménez Jiménez, Natalia et al.
Economics Letters 162 (2018) 41–44
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Economics Letters
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Thinking fast, thinking badly
Natalia Jimenez a,b, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara b,*, Jean-Robert Tyran c, Erik Wengström d
a Departamento de Economia, Metodos Cuantitativos e Historia Economica, Universidad Pablo Olavide, Ctra. de Utrera, 1, Sevilla, E-41013, Spain
b Middlesex University London, Department of Economics, Business School , Hendon Campus, The Burroughs, NW4 4BT London, United Kingdom
c Department of Economics, University of Vienna, Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
d Department of Economics, University of Lund, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
h i g h l i g h t s
• We test for the construct validity of the cognitive reflection test.
• Response times indicate that incorrect answers are quicker than correct answers.
• Impulsive subjects complete the test quicker than reflective subjects.
• Our data suggest that intuitive and incorrect answers should be treated differently.
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a b s t r a c t
We test for the construct validity of the cognitive reflection test (CRT) by eliciting response times.We find
that incorrect answers to the CRT are quicker than correct answers. At the individual level, we classify
subjects into impulsive and reflective, depending on whether they choose the incorrect intuitive answer
or the correct answer themajority of the time.We show that impulsive subjects complete the test quicker
than reflective subjects.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Dual-system models of human thinking differentiate two cog-
nitive processes: a type 1-system that is fast, automatic and
non-conscious, and a type 2-system that is slow, controlled
and conscious (Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich and West, 2000).
Economists have recently become interested in the relation be-
tween these two cognitive processes and decision-making. The
cognitive reflection test (CRT) introduced by Frederick (2005) has
emerged as a popular tool to identify which way of thinking sub-
jects use. The test consists of three questions that have ‘‘an intuitive
answer [that] does spring quickly to mind (. . . ) but this ‘‘impulsive’’
answer is wrong. Anyone who reflects upon it for even a moment
would recognize [the correct answer]’’ (Frederick, 2005, pp. 26–27).
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While scores in the CRT have been related to risk preferences or
behavioral biases (Frederick, 2005; Oechssler et al., 2009; Bergman
et al., 2010;Hoppe andKusterer, 2011; Cheung et al., 2014; Brañas-
Garza et al., 2012; Andersson et al., 2016), we are not aware of
any paper that directly tests the implicit assumption that the CRT
measures the tendency to override an intuitive and spontaneous
response that is incorrect and to engage in further reflection that
leads to giving the correct response. More precisely, we lack evi-
dence about the construct validity of the CRT showing that quick
responses to the CRT are likely to be incorrect, while correct an-
swers take longer. Our paper is an attempt to fill out this gap.
2. Data
Hard-copy invitation letters were sent out to a random sample
of the Danish population aged between 18 and 80. A total of 2,347
subjects logged on to ourwebpage and participated (average age=
46.7, SD = 14.3; 1,209 males and 1,138 females). The experiment
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.10.018
0165-1765/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
nd/4.0/).
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Fig. 1. Cumulative response times to each question.
consisted of two incentivized parts, a public good game (see Thöni
et al., 2012; Fosgaard et al., 2014) and a risk elicitation task (see
Andersson et al., 2016). The incentivized part was followed by a
questionnaire, which included the CRT (Frederick, 2005), as well
as basic socio-economic questions, the Big Five personality test
and a 20-item cognitive ability test similar to a Raven’s progressive
matrices test (henceforth referred to as the cognitive ability test).1
3. Results
3.1. Correct answers and response times
Fig. 1 depicts the cumulative response times for subjects that
gave correct and incorrect answers to each question (see Section
A3 in theOnline Appendix formore detailed descriptive statistics).2
We find that subjects who provided the correct answer devoted
more time to each question (p<0.001).3
Fig. 1 also reveals that the difference in speed between correct
and incorrect answers differs across questions. The difference is
particularly striking in question 1, and much less pronounced in
question 3. It could be that the first question has a more salient
intuitive answer, or perhaps subjects figure out after the first ques-
tion that they need to think longer since these are tricky if not trick
questions.4 Both explanations are consistent with our data since
mean response times are increasing with questions (see Section
A3 of the Online Appendix). As a robustness check, we collected
additional data using an alternative measure of cognitive reflec-
tion (Toplak et al., 2014) with randomized and non-randomized
questions to test for possible order effects (see Section 4 below).
Overall, we do not find evidence of order effects, suggesting that
the different patterns observed across questions is likely not due
1 More information about the details of the questionnaire, the recruitment proce-
dures and the sample composition is presented in Sections A1 and A2 of the Online
Appendix.
2 Response times of more than 360 s have been excluded since data contains
outliers due to people taking a break or being interrupted. The choice of cut off is
not important for any of our results.
3 Unless otherwise noted, we use the Mann–Whitney and Kolmogorov–Smirnov
tests.
4 These arguments also relate to the ‘‘sequence effect’’ in Brañas-Garza et al.
(2015). They report that subjects score better when questions are presented in the
standard order, and the smallest (largest) proportion of correct answers is usually
observed in question 1 (question 3).
Fig. 2. Cumulative response times of impulsive, reflective and other subjects.
to the order of presentation, but rather due to characteristics of the
questions.5
3.2. Intuitive but incorrect answers and response time
Our previous findings support the hypothesis that fast re-
sponses are associated with incorrect answers, and vice versa for
slow responses. While ‘‘impulsive’’ subjects are frequently defined
as those who perform poorly in the CRT, subjects who provide
the intuitive (wrong) answer might be treated differently than
those who simply provided any incorrect answer (Noussair et al.,
2014; Cueva et al., 2015; Ponti and Rodriguez-Lara, 2015). We
follow Cueva et al. (2015) and use the iCRT index which adds up
the number of intuitive answers, iCRT∈{0,1,2,3}. We then define
Impulsive subjects as those who scored two or more in the iCRT
(39% of the sample) and Reflective subjects as those who provided
two or more correct answers in the CRT (49% of the sample). The
remaining 12% are classified as Other.
Fig. 2 displays the cumulative response time distributions for
the three types of subjects. We find that Impulsive subjects are
5 For further details, see Section A6 on the Online Appendix.
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Table 1
CRT score, OLS regression.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Response time 0.00047*** 0.00054*** 0.00055*** 0.00067***
[9.10e−05] [9.07e−05] [8.91e−05] [8.52e−05]
Female −0.422*** −0.406*** −0.366***
[0.044] [0.045] [0.046]
Age 30–39 −0.018 −0.139* −0.011
[0.081] [0.081] [0.078]
Age 40–49 −0.005 −0.107 0.0422
[0.072] [0.073] [0.071]
Age 50–59 −0.008 −0.086 0.164**
[0.074] [0.075] [0.075]
Age 60–80 −0.241*** −0.333*** 0.040
[0.077] [0.078] [0.081]
Basic education −0.095 −0.048
[0.081] [0.077]
Short secondary education 0.164*** 0.115**
[0.056] [0.054]




Big5 personality scores No No No Yes
Constant 1.328***[0.034] 1.567*** [0.065] 1.473***[0.065] 0.947***[0.065]
Observations 2,347 2,347 2,347 2,333
R-squared 0.011 0.053 0.088 0.185
Note: Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
faster (in total response times) than Reflective ones (p <0.001),
while Other subjects are slower than both the Impulsive and Re-
flective ones (p<0.001).
3.3. Regression analysis
To learn more about the relationship between CRT scores and
response times, we present a series of regressions in which we
control for other factors that are likely to be correlated with both
CRT scores and response times.
Table 1 displays the result from a series of OLS regressions
using CRT score as the dependent variable. In column 1, we have
included response time as the single explanatory variable. The
response time has been top-coded at 1080 s, i.e. the response times
of subjects that take more than 1080 s are recoded as 1080. Our
results are robust to the choice of different cutoffs and also to
replacing the OLS with an ordered logit or probit (see Table A6
on the Online Appendix). In columns 2–5, we include additional
controls for gender, age, education, cognitive ability and big five
personality traits.
The main message of Table 1 is that longer response times are
significantly associated with higher CRT scores. A one standard
deviation increase in response time corresponds up to a 0.15 stan-
dard deviation change in the CRT score. The effect is relatively
consistent across specifications and it becomes stronger as we
includemore control variables. Moreover, CRT scores are related to
gender, education and cognitive ability. Notably, there is a negative
effect of age effect in columns 2 and 3, but this effect vanishes once
we include the cognitive ability test score (column 4). Hence, the
decline in CRT with age effect appears to be driven by a decline in
cognitive ability.
Table 1 only considers the total score on the CRT and does
not distinguish between intuitive and other incorrect answers.
Table 2 looks at this issue by means of OLS regressions, where the
association to response times is different for Impulsive and Other
subjects (the Reflective subjects constitute the left-out category.)6
6 The dependent variable is total response time (in all three questions). Again
the results are not sensitive to the choice of cutoff for the top-coding and hold if
we instead use a Tobit model or median regressions without top-coding (see Table
A7–A8 in the Online Appendix).
Our estimates show that the relationship reported in Table 1
is driven by the Impulsive subjects, which are on average much
faster than the Reflective ones. Impulsive subjects have response
times that are up to 0.43 of a standard deviation shorter than the
Reflective subjects. To the contrary, subjects who perform poorly
on the CRT but are not classified as Impulsive (Other) take more
time than the Reflective subjects did. Thus, to measure impulsive
thinking, it is important to distinguish between different types of
wrong answers and not only count the overall number of incorrect
answers. As we include more covariates, the coefficient for the
Impulsive subjects increases, whereas the coefficient for the Other
subjects decreases. Response times are correlatedwith gender, age
and cognitive ability.
4. Robustness check
We use post-experimental questionnaires in three other ex-
periments to investigate the robustness of our findings. First, we
elicited the response time of 311 students (M Age= 21.2 years, SD
= 3; 132 males and 179 females) who participated in a laboratory
experiment at the Universidad Pablo de Olavide in Seville (Spain).
We utilize the alternativemeasure of cognitive reflection in Toplak
et al. (2014) in experiments run at the Universidad de Valencia and
the Universidad de Alicante, with a total of 312 participants (MAge
= 22.7 years, SD = 5.8; 119 males and 193 females). In addition,
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) was used to collect data from
195 participants (M Age= 37.8 years, SD= 13.2; 81males and 114
females) using the Toplak et al.’s version of the test, but with the
questions presented in a randomized order.
Overall, we find similar results when we look at these data (a
detailed analysis can be found in the Online Appendix, Section
A5–A6). We confirm that Impulsive subjects are always faster (in
terms of total response time) than Reflective ones (p <0.045). We
do not find that the order of presentation affects the difference
in response times between correct and incorrect answers in the
MTurk experiment.
5. Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first providing
evidence that fast answers to the CRT tend to be incorrect, while
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Table 2
Total response time, OLS regression.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Impulsive −80.89*** −85.82*** −87.78*** −107.1***
[10.74] [10.71] [10.84] [11.23]
Other 75.00*** 63.12*** 60.83*** 43.54***
[16.28] [16.09] [16.21] [16.33]
Female 21.17** 21.24** 18.16*
[10.04] [10.27] [10.98]
Age 30–39 8.955 12.49 6.900
[17.99] [18.43] [18.48]
Age 40–49 22.85 26.20 14.75
[16.16] [16.57] [16.91]
Age 50–59 46.47*** 50.48*** 26.92
[16.48] [16.94] [17.90]
Age 60–80 128.1*** 132.9*** 94.68***
[17.10] [17.52] [19.08]
Basic education −18.16 −19.48
[18.31] [18.24]
Short secondary education −8.822 −7.907
[12.78] [12.75]




Big5 personality scores No No No Yes
Constant 306.6*** 255.8*** 263.8*** 309.4***
[7.167] [14.39] [15.47] [62.95]
Observations 2,347 2,347 2,347 2,333
R-squared 0.044 0.077 0.078 0.097
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
subjects who take longer tend to provide the correct answer. Our
findings lend support to the assumption underlying the test that
responses to the CRT can be used to measure the tendency to
override intuitive responses. However, our findings also show that
merely summing the number of incorrect answers will provide
a poor measure of intuitive thinking. Instead, it is important to
distinguish between intuitive answers and other types of incorrect
answers.
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